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estate. The court found it "unconscionable for the attorney of
this opponent to purchase the right, title and interest of his client
and thereafter file an opposition in the name of said client.""
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Harriet S. Daggett*
A settlement of community after dissolution by judgment for
separation is under consideration in Daigre v. Daigre.' Two
most interesting issues are presented, that of a stock dividend
and a pension.
The husband owned certain stock in the Coca-Cola Company
when he was married. Later, during the marriage, a stock
dividend was declared by the company. The wife claimed half
of the additional shares as community property. An exhaustive
and scholarly discussion of the nature of a stock dividend as
distinguished from cash dividends from any source appears in
the opinion. The court held that stock dividends are not income;
that they do not alter the recipient's share in the corporation
but merely express it in a different number of units representing
the same original holding. Thus, the stock dividends were not
community but the separate property of the husband who had
brought them into the marriage.
The value of the company and hence that of the husband's
holdings in it had definitely increased since his marriage, but it
had not resulted from the labor, industry, or expenditures of
either spouse under Article 2408 of the Code and hence was not
community property.
The discussion of the nature of the pension received after
marriage is also clear, rewarding, and satisfying. The court
stated that the arrangement made by a company for a pension
must be examined in every case. If it is established by contract
with the employee as an anticipated right of deferred compen-
sation, then obviously it is income from labor of the husband
and would fall into the community. If it is optional to the com-
pany, even though in recognition of services previously per-
formed, it is a gratuity and separate property of the husband.
11. 230 La. 167, 88 So.2d 15 (1956).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 228 La. 682, 83 So.2d 900 (1955).
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The latter was found to be the situation in this case. On re-
hearing, the original decision was adhered to.
Again, in Abraham v. Abraham,2 an involved settlement of a
community dissolved by judgment for separation is presented.
Disentangling the separate property of the wife and that of her
son by a previous marriage called for great detail in accounting
and weighing of evidence.
The major legal issue was concerned with increase in value
of a business, one half of which came to the wife in settlement
of her first husband's estate. The court found this increase not
to be a fruit of her separate estate under Article 2386 of the
Revised Civil Code of 1870 as amended. Article 2408 of the
Code was then studied and the court found that the enhance-
ment in value was not due to the "ordinary course of things,"
but to the industry and good management of the wife. Hence,
the amount in question was community property.
The wife was held to be entitled to certain rents and revenues
from her separate property after the date of her filing of the
notarial act required by Act 286 of 1944, amending Article 2386
of the Code. The commingling principle was applied to defeat
several items claimed.
In Byrd v. Byrd3 a widow sued to have a conveyance made
by her husband set aside. Usufruct had been retained by the
husband. No consideration was found to have been received by
the husband. Hence, the court found the conveyance to have
been a donation in disguise with retention of usufruct and an
absolute nullity, being against the law. Any person at interest
may bring an action to set aside such a conveyance and the ac-
tion is not prescriptible. It appeared that the property may have
been purchased with separate funds of the husband but no
recitation to preserve the property as separate was made in the
deed and the property was acquired during the marriage and
hence was community.
The case of Abunza v. Olivier4 involved a settlement of com-
munity after judgment of separation and divorce. After a
thorough evaluation of evidence, too lengthy to be detailed here,
2. 230 La. 78, 87 So.2d 735 (1956).
3. 230 La. 260, 88 So.2d 214 (1956).
4. 230 La. 445, 88 So.2d 815 (1956).
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the court decided upon disputed items in accordance with well-
settled principles.
Property inherited by either spouse, the identity of which
is not lost by commingling or otherwise, remains the separate
property of husband or wife. Gifts made to either spouse, par-
ticularly, properly proved, whether manual or otherwise, are
separate property of the donee.
Money, labor, or industry expended by the spouses upon sep-
arate property of either will not necessarily cause a debt to be
owed by the separate estate of the spouse to the community. A
debt is owed only if the separate estate has been enhanced in
value by virtue of expenditures or efforts by partners in com-
munity. Again, separate funds of the husband spent during the
existence of the community will not be credited to him unless
it is proved that the community property was enhanced in value
because of the expenditure.
A fee received by the husband during the existence of the
community is community property even though part of the work
done was after dissolution of the community. Great care was
taken throughout the analysis of evidence to find that the hus-
band's separate property was preserved as such in separate,
earmarked bank accounts so that the commingling principle did
not apply.
The case of Messersmith v. Messersmith5 deals with parti-
tion of a community. dissolved by separation of bed and board
and divorce. Disputed items are as follows. The husband main-
tained that certain stock must remain in toto under his control
because as an employee of the company, he was under a restric-
tion against selling the stock without first offering it to of-
ficers of the company or to other co-shareholders. The court
held that no limitation of this nature could alter the law of
community property and prevent a vesting of one-half of all
community assets in the wife by right.
During the existence of the community, a certificate was
issued to the husband in an employee group insurance company.
The policy was valueless at the time of the dissolution of the
community and would continue to be so until he severed his
connection with his employers by death or otherwise. However,
5. 229 La. 495, 86 So.2d 169 (1956).
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the court found the certificate to be a thing of value even if de-
ferred in realization, acquired during the-marriage and hence,
community property.
The community is dissolved as of the date of judgment for
separation - not of the filing of the suit. Thus, the husband
owes the community all cash dividends received by him until the
date of judgment. Alimony pendente lite is grounded on the
husband's legal duty to support his wife, regardless of fault on
her part and is payable out of community funds. After dissolu-
tion of the community, the husband does not owe his wife ali-
mony unless the court awards it, which was not the case here.
Thus, alimony paid after judgment by the husband must be
charged against the wife's share in the community. The com-
mingling rule was applied against the husband's demands for
credit to his separate estate. The law allows the wife an in-
junction to protect her share of community and she may not be
penalized for using it. Interest was allowed on the debt to the
wife without need to amend pleadings.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
A contention that Civil Code Article 167 is out of harmony
with modern conditions and should be held repealed by implica-
tion was rejected in Lowther v. Fireside Mutual Life Insurance
Co.' The court concluded, contrary to the contention of plaintiff,
that the prohibition against a major's binding himself for a
longer term than five years is still in full force and effect. It
therefore affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's suit to recover on
an employment contract beyond the allowable period.
A contract between the Louisiana Department of Highways
and a road contractor was held to contain a stipulation pour
autrui in favor of an abutting landowner in Ortego, v. Caldwell.2
In consequence, the landowner, whose levees were to be rebuilt
to his satisfaction, was given judgment against the contractor
for damages resulting from the contractor's failure properly to
fulfill his obligation. That the stipulation for the rebuilding of
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 228 La. 946, 84 So.2d 596 (1955).
2. 229 La. 907, 87 So.2d 124 (1956).
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